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Abstract—Despite the remarkable performance and generalization levels of deep learning models in a wide range of artificial
intelligence tasks, it has been demonstrated that these models can be easily fooled by the addition of imperceptible but malicious
perturbations to natural inputs. These altered inputs are known in the literature as adversarial examples. In this paper we propose a
novel probabilistic framework to generalize and extend adversarial attacks in order to produce a desired probability distribution for the
classes when we apply the attack method to a large number of inputs. This novel attack strategy provides the attacker with greater
control over the target model, and increases the complexity of detecting that the model is being attacked. We introduce four different
strategies to efficiently generate such attacks, and illustrate our approach extending DeepFool, a state-of-the-art attack algorithm to
generate adversarial examples. We also experimentally validate our approach for the spoken command classification task, an
exemplary machine learning problem in the audio domain. Our results demonstrate that we can closely approximate any probability
distribution for the classes while maintaining a high fooling rate and by injecting imperceptible perturbations to the inputs.
Index Terms—Adversarial Examples, DeepFool, Speech Command Classification.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
D EEP Neural Networks (DNNs) are currently the core ofa wide range of technologies applied in security critical
tasks, such as self-driving vehicles [1], [2], identity recogni-
tion systems [3], [4], [5] or malware detection systems [6],
[7], and therefore, the effectiveness and the robustness are
two fundamental requirements for these models. However,
it has been found that DNNs can be easily deceived by
inputs perturbed imperceptibly for humans, known as ad-
versarial examples [8], which implies a security breach that
can be exploited by an adversary with malicious ends. Thus,
the discovery of such vulnerabilities has raised a wide range
of research lines focused on new attack strategies.
The most common adversarial attacks are mainly fo-
cused on perturbing an input to change the class of a pre-
trained model during its prediction-phase, known as evasion
attacks, such as modifying a traffic signal to be misclassified
by an image recognition system on a self-driving car. These
perturbations can be created with the objective of changing
the (originally correct) output to any other (incorrect) class,
named untargeted attacks, or even to force the model to
produce a particular target class, for instance, to misclassify
a stop signal with a speed limit signal. In the last case, we
refer to them as targeted attacks, which provide a greater
control over the target model than untargeted attacks.
Recently, more complex and effective attack strategies
have been proposed in the literature, such as universal attacks
[9], in which the aim is to create a single input-agnostic
perturbation capable of fooling the model when it is applied
to any incoming input. In addition, some strategies are
capable of providing to the adversary more control over
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the target model. For instance, in backdoor attacks [10], [11]
a small proportion of the training data is modified so that,
in the presence of a particular trigger, it is possible to force
the model to return a particular class with high probability,
without reducing the effectiveness of the model in natural
inputs. This creates a backdoor in the model that can be
exploited by an adversary, for example, to impersonate
people in identity recognition scenarios.
In this work, we focus on creating an attack strategy
capable of providing a new form of control over the target
models. In particular, we introduce a strategy which pro-
vides to the adversary not only the ability to deceive the
model, but also to produce any (a posteriori) probability
distribution of the output classes, even in scenarios where
we can only introduce very low amounts of distortion to the
inputs.
1.1 Objective
Let us consider a target machine learning model M that
implements a classification function f : X → Y , where
X ⊆ Rd represents the d-dimensional input space, and
Y = {y1, . . . , yk} the set of possible output classes, where
yi represents the i-th class.
The main objective of this paper is to create an attack
method Φ that is able to efficiently produce adversarial
examples x′ = Φ(x) not only for the local objective of
achieving f(x′) 6= f(x), but also to accomplish the global
objective of producing a specific probability distribution for
the classes P˜(Y ) = (p˜1, . . . , p˜k), that is:
Px∼P(X) [f(Φ(x))=yi] = p˜i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, (1)
where P(X) represents the probability distribution of the
natural inputs. The idea of controlling the probability distri-
bution of the classes produced by the adversarial examples
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2provides a novel perspective to design such attacks. For in-
stance, an adversary can try to replicate the same probability
distribution produced by the target DNN on clean inputs, or
change it during time, in order to increase the complexity of
detecting that the model is being systematically fooled.
1.2 Contributions
The contributions of our work are the following: (1) we
introduce a novel probabilistic attack approach capable of
producing a particular adversarial class probability distri-
bution of the classes while fooling any incoming input, (2)
we propose four different methods to create the optimal
policies to guide such attacks, and (3) we validate them
for the speech command classification task, an exemplary
machine learning problem in the audio domain, compar-
ing the effectiveness of the four strategies under multiple
criteria, such as the similarity of the produced probability
distributions and the target distributions, the percentage of
inputs fooled by the attack or the number of parameters to
be optimized for each method.
2 RELATED WORK
The intriguing vulnerability of deep learning models to
adversarial attacks was first reported in [8], for the image
classification task, in which box-constrained L-BFGS op-
timization approaches were employed to craft the adver-
sarial examples. Although the study of this phenomenon
has focused mainly on computer vision tasks, it has been
shown that such vulnerabilities can be found in other tasks
and domains, such as audio, text and natural language
processing [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17].
Adversarial attacks must satisfy two fundamental re-
quirements in order to pose an actual thread to deep
learning models: they must be able to create perturbations
capable of fooling the target model for any input sample,
and introduce imperceptible perturbations. Therefore, adver-
sarial attack methods mainly focus on optimizing these two
objectives. However, more ambitious methods have been
proposed in order to generate more powerful attacks, or
achieve more complex objectives.
Most of adversarial perturbation generation methods
can be grouped in different classes according to the scope
of the objective of the adversarial attack. The most fre-
quent methods focus on fooling a target model during its
prediction-phase, with varying degree of generality, such as
individual perturbations (designed for one particular input),
single-class perturbations [18] (designed to fool any input of
one particular class) or universal perturbations [9] (input-
agnostic perturbations). Other methods aim to increase the
risk of adversarial attacks in more realistic scenarios, such as
creating perturbations that can be deployed in the physical
world [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], or maximizing the trans-
ferability of the perturbations across different target models
or architectures, which have not been used to generate the
perturbation [24], [25].
Relying on a different attack strategy, some methods are
based on including adversarially perturbed inputs in the
training dataset that will be used to train the model, in
order to induce an adversarial behaviour during the test-
phase [11], [26], [27], [28], [29]. More specific attack algo-
rithms have been also proposed to address particular tasks,
domains or scenarios, which imply additional restrictions or
requirements, such as graph-based clustering [30] or traffic
signal analysis [31].
The approach we introduce can be taken as a novel
attack strategy, which targets the more complex goal of pro-
ducing a particular probability distribution for the classes
after the systematic application of the attack, while preserv-
ing the ability of fooling the model for any incoming input
sample. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has
addressed the problem of producing such adversarial effect
on the target model.
Closer to our work, [31] and [32] introduce a more
general approach to create adversarial attacks, which allows
the optimization of different objectives. In both methods, a
generative model is used to create perturbations, and the
training procedure of the model considers regularization
terms used to model some features of the data. In [32],
generative networks are used to sample adversarial inputs
which are capable of fooling the network and satisfy addi-
tional restrictions, for instance, to occupy a low portion of
the image, to be robust against real-world conditions such as
lighting effects or rotations, or to be inconspicuous to human
observers. In [31], domain constraints are imposed by using
a remapping function, and an additional regularization term
is included to model other particular requirements, such as
ensuring that the perturbed input features follow a particu-
lar distribution.
However, the are significant difference between these
methods and the approach we introduce. Firstly, both meth-
ods focus on ensuring that the adversarial inputs contain
some specific data-features, due to the particular domain
requirements. However, we focus on inducing a global be-
haviour on the output of the model, with no regard about
particular data-features on the input. As consequence, our
approach can be used to extend any targeted attack algo-
rithm, and it is extensible to any task, which provides a
much more general solution. Finally, our approach relies
on an efficient linear program, avoiding costly non-linear
optimization procedures.
2.1 DeepFool
Our approach relies on a method capable of creating tar-
geted adversarial examples. Although any targeted attack
algorithm can be used, in this paper we employed a re-
formulation of DeepFool [33], a state-of-the art attack algo-
rithm, in order to introduce and illustrate our approach. A
detailed introduction to this algorithm is provided in Section
5.1.
Previous related works have proposed different exten-
sions of DeepFool in order to increase the effectiveness of
the attack. In [11], [34], the algorithm is reformulated to
generate targeted individual adversarial attacks. In [35] the
authors propose adding Gaussian noise to the perturbation
during the crafting process to improve the effectiveness of
the attack.
In [9], DeepFool is extended to create universal adversar-
ial examples, that is, input-agnostic perturbations able to fool
3the model for any incoming input. Moreover, the strategy
presented in [9] has been adapted in recent works to develop
universal adversarial examples for different tasks in the
audio domain [18]. Similarly to our method, universal at-
tacks provide some global capabilities, in particular, fooling
any incoming input with the same perturbation. However,
such methods are not capable of controlling the probability
distribution for the output classes. In addition, note that our
method employs individual attacks, which produce more
optimized perturbations for any input, and therefore, lower
amounts of distortion.
3 PRODUCING SPECIFIC CLASS PROBABILITY DIS-
TRIBUTIONS
We focus on generating a higher level attack approach in
which the application of the attack for many incoming in-
puts x, assuming an input data distribution x ∼ P(X), can
produce not only a missclassification for every x, but also
a desired (fixed) probability distribution of the predicted
classes by the target model P˜(Y ) = (p˜1, . . . , p˜k).
3.1 Assumptions and key concepts
In this section, we specify a number of assumptions and
concepts that will be used to develop our methodology.
First of all, we assume that the clean input x is correctly
classified by the target classifier, and that f(x′) 6= f(x), in
order to ensure that the attack is actually fooling the model.
In addition, being ϕ : Rd×Rd → R a distortion metric and 
a maximum distortion threshold, we require the adversarial
example to satisfy ϕ(x, x′) ≤ , to ensure that x′ is as similar
as possible to x.
The approach we introduce will use a targeted adver-
sarial attack as basis, that is, attacks capable of forcing
the model to produce a particular target class f(x′) = yt.
However, setting a maximum distortion supposes that we
may not reach every possible target class by adversarially
perturbing an input sample. For this reason, we consider
that yj is a reachable class from x if it is possible to generate
a targeted adversarial example x′, so that ϕ(x, x′) <  and
f(x′) = yj , and will be denoted as Φ(x) → yj . We assume
that f(x) is always a reachable class. However, if there are
not reachable classes yj 6= f(x), we will consider that we
can not create any valid adversarial example for x.
3.2 Attack description
The main rationale of the approach we introduce is to extend
or generalize a targeted adversarial attack method in order
to achieve the global objective of producing any probability
distribution of the output classes, while maintaining a high
fooling rate and minimally distorted inputs. To enable such
attacks, our method consists on generalizing the attack al-
gorithm to be stochastic, so that the target class is randomly
selected, and the probability of transitioning from the class
yi to the class yj depends on the source class yi and the
input x at hand. These probabilities will be represented in a
transition matrix Tk×k, where ti,j represents the probability
of transitioning from the class yi to the class yj .
Although the transition-matrix T depends only on the
source class of the inputs, in practice, it might not be
possible to move all the inputs towards any class without
surpassing the distortion threshold . In order to address
this limitation, given an input x, the transition probabilities
will be normalized considering that the probability of mov-
ing to a non-reachable class is zero. Let (ti,1, . . . , ti,k) be the
probability distribution assigned in T corresponding to the
inputs with source class yi. Being Y = {yj : Φ(x) → yj}
the set of reachable classes for one particular input x of
class yi, the probability of selecting yj as the target class
is determined by:
t′i,j =
{ ti,j∑
yj∈Y ti,j
if yj ∈ Y
0 else.
(2)
Note that the probability t′i,i will represent the probabil-
ity of maintaining an input in its own class yi, and therefore,
these values should be as low as possible in order to ensure
that we maximize the number of inputs that will fool the
model. However, depending on the probability distribution
of the classes we want to produce, a nonzero value for
these probabilities may be needed to achieve such goals,
for instance, if we require a high probability for one class
but this class is seldomly reached from inputs belonging to
the rest of classes.
Algorithm 1 provides the pseudocode of this approach.
By modeling the decision to move from one class to an-
other in this way, it is possible to approximate with which
probability the model will predict each class. This capability
allows the attacker to have more control over the model, or
make it more difficult for the defender to detect attacks, for
example, by maintaining the initial probability distribution
of the classes despite inducing errors in the model.
4 CONSTRUCTING OPTIMAL TRANSITION MATRI-
CES TO GUIDE TARGETED ATTACKS
In this section we introduce different strategies to construct
the optimal transition matrix Tk×k which, used to stochasti-
cally decide the class transitions, produces a target probabil-
ity distribution P˜(Y ) = (p˜1, . . . , p˜k) for the output classes.
Formally, being X = {x1, . . . , xn} a set of inputs sampled
from a data distribution P(X), and P(Y ) = (p1, . . . , pk) the
original probability distribution of the classes assigned by
the target classifier, we want to obtain a transition matrix T
that satisfies:
(p1, . . . , pk)

t1,1 t1,2 · · · t1,k
t2,1 t2,2 · · · t2,k
...
...
. . .
...
tk,1 tk,2 · · · tk,k
=(p˜1, . . . , p˜k) (3)
The main purpose of these approaches is to ensure that
the transition matrix is capable of producing the desired
probability distribution given the conditions and partic-
ularities of the problems, such as the initial probability
distribution or the reachability of the inputs of each class.
Additionally, in order to increase the expected proportion of
inputs to be fooled, the values in the diagonal needs to be
as low as possible.
We will define the problem of finding such matrices as a
linear program, in which we will use different strategies to
restrict the possible values of the matrix, in order to fulfill
4Algorithm 1 Generating adversarial class probability distri-
butions
Input: A classification model f , a set of classes Y =
{y1, . . . , yk}, an input sample x of ground-truth class yi,
a maximum distortion threshold , a transition matrix T
Output: An adversarial example x′
1: reachable[1, . . . , k]← initialize with False
2: for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} do
3: vj ← Generate a perturbation for x targeting class yj .
4: if f(x+ vj) = yj ∧ ϕ(x, x+ vj) ≤  then
5: reachable[j]← True
6: end if
7: end for
8: Y ← {yj ∈ Y : reachable[j] = True}
9: (ti,1, . . . , ti,k)← probability distribution in the row of T
corresponding to the class yi.
10: tsum ←
∑
yj∈Y(ti,j)
11: for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} do
12: if reachable[j] then
13: t′i,j ← ti,jtsum
14: else
15: t′i,j ← 0
16: end if
17: end for
18: y∗ ← randomly select a class in Y according to the
probabilities (t′i,1, . . . , t
′
i,k)
Return the adversarial example with the targeted per-
turbation v∗ corresponding to class y∗:
19: x′ ← x+ v∗
all the specified requirements. All the methods provide ad-
vantages and disadvantages, as will be discussed in Section
4.5.
4.1 Method 1: Baseline
The first method will only take into account the most basic
requirements in order to generate a valid transition matrix,
and therefore, the results obtained with this method will be
used as baseline. In this way, we will be able to compare the
gain in terms of effectiveness that the following methods
imply, in which different strategies will be used to restrict
the search space and make the transition matrices better fit
the characteristics and limitations of the problem.
Thus, this method consists on directly searching a tran-
sition matrix T that satisfies equation (3), while minimizing
the sum of the diagonal of T . In addition, the number of
null ti,j probabilities outside the diagonal of T should be
avoided, since they reduce the number of possible classes to
which we can move the inputs of class yi. To achieve this,
we will introduce an auxiliary variable matrix Lk×k, so that
li,i = 0 and 0 ≤ li,j ≤ ξ, i 6= j, with ξ ∈ R and ξ << 1/k.
Each li,j will be included in the set of restrictions as a lower
bound of ti,j to require a minimum probability, li,j ≤ ti,j ,
i 6= j. At the same time, the values in L will be maximized
in the objective function of the linear program:
Taking into account all these basic requirements, the
optimal transition matrix T can be obtained by solving the
following linear program:
min z =
k∑
i=1
ti,i −
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
j 6=i
li,j
s.t. P(Y ) · T = P˜(Y )
k∑
j=1
ti,j = 1 ∀i∈{1, . . . , k}
ti,j ≥ li,j ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6= j
0 ≤ ti,j ≤ 1 ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
0 ≤ li,j ≤ ξ ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
(4)
4.2 Method 2
In the second method we will extend the linear program
introduced in Method 1, to include an additional restriction
to the values of T in order to better fit the characteristics
and limitations of the problem.
In this method, an auxiliary matrix Rk×k will be consid-
ered, in which ri,j represents the number of samples in X
that, with a ground-truth class yi, can reach the class yj :
ri,j = |{x∈X : f(x)=yi ∧ Φ(x)→yj}|. (5)
We assume that the ground-truth class of an input is always
reachable, and therefore, ri,i = |{x ∈ X : f(x) = yi}|, 1 ≤
i ≤ k. If we divide each ri,j by the number of inputs of class
yi, the value will represent the proportion of samples in X
which, with a ground-truth class yi, can reach the class yj :
r′i,j =
ri,j
|{x∈X : f(x)=yi}| . (6)
Note that we are estimating, by using the set X , the max-
imum proportion of successful targeted attacks that it is
possible to create for the inputs in P(X), for any pair of
source class yi and target class yj . Therefore, to generate a
realistic transition matrix T , we will maintain the following
restriction: ti,j ≤ r′i,j . This restriction seeks to avoid as-
signing transition probabilities so high that, in practice, will
be unlikely to be obtained due to the distortion threshold,
which may suppose a loss of effectiveness regarding the
global objective of producing P˜(Y ), as the algorithm may
not be able to successfully follow the guidance of T . How-
ever, setting an upper bound to the values of T according
to the values of R may suppose increasing the values in the
diagonal, decreasing the fooling rate expectation.
Based on all these facts, we will generate the optimal
5transition matrix T by solving the following linear program:
min z =
k∑
i=1
ti,i −
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
j 6=i
li,j
s.t. P(Y ) · T = P˜(Y )
k∑
j=1
ti,j = 1 ∀i∈{1, . . . , k}
ti,j ≥ li,j ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6= j
0 ≤ ti,j ≤ 1 ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
0 ≤ li,j ≤ ξ ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
ti,j ≤ r′i,j ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
(7)
4.3 Method 3
The main drawback of the strategy used in Method 2 is
that establishing upper bounds for every value of T can
significantly limit the space of possible transition matrices,
and therefore, limit the range of objective probability distri-
butions P˜(Y ) that can be produced.
For instance, even if it is estimated using the training set
that it is not possible to move more than a certain proportion
of cases r′i,j from the class yi to the class yj , in some cases
it can be necessary to assign to ti,j values higher than r′i,j ,
for example, to produce yj with a very high probability.
In such case, even if reaching the class yj from the class
yi is unlikely, we can specify that, when this transition is
possible, we want to produce it with a high probability.
Therefore, in order to be able to produce a wide range
of distributions P˜(Y ), Method 3 does not impose an up-
per bound constraint on the values of T . Apart from
that, the row-normalized version of Rk×k will be used in
this method, denoted as Rˆ, which, already represents a
transition matrix. In particular, the probability distribution
P(Y ) · Rˆ is the one that would be achieved if the target
class of each input x is uniformly selected in the set of
reachable classes for x. As our intention is to produce P˜(Y ),
we aim to find an auxiliary transition matrix Qk×k, so that
P(Y ) · Rˆ · Q = P˜(Y ). If we denote T = Rˆ · Q, we can
generate T by solving the following linear program:
min z =
k∑
i=1
ti,i
s.t. P(Y ) · T = P˜(Y )
k∑
j=1
qi,j = 1 ∀i∈{1, . . . , k}
0 ≤ qi,j ≤ 1 ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
(8)
In this case, the linear program will minimize the values
in the diagonal of T , being T the product of two matrices.
Therefore, note that if the values of R are non-zero for
the majority of its positions, the sum of the values in the
diagonal of T can not be zero, compromising the fooling rate
of the attack. For the same reason, now we do not require
an auxiliary variable to avoid null values in T .
4.4 Method 4
As we introduced in Section 3.2, even if we specify a
probability ti,j for every possible transition, in practice, an
input sample may not be able to reach any possible class
without surpassing the maximum distortion allowed, so
we need to normalize those probabilities to consider only
the reachable classes from that input. However, the two
previous methods have not considered this effect during
the training process, which may cause a reduction in the
effectiveness of the resulting matrices when they are applied
during the prediction-phase of the model. For this reason, in
this method, we will make use of that information with the
aim of achieving a more comprehensive attack.
To construct the transition matrix T , we start by estimat-
ing the probabilities that an input x of class yi can reach a
particular subset of classes S ⊂ Y but not Y − S , that is,
yi ∈ S ⇔ Φ(x) → yi. We will denote these probabilities
Px∼P(X)(S|f(x) = yi), or P (S|yi) for simplicity. In order to
estimate these values, the set of reachable classes S will be
computed for each x ∈ X , and the frequency of each subset
will be calculated.
The next step is to define with which probability an
input x of class f(x) = yi and with a set of reachable
classes S will be moved from yi to the class yj , that
is, Px∼P(X)(yj |f(x) = yi,S), or P (yj |yi,S) for simplicity.
These probabilities will be also denoted as V Si,j when refer-
ring to them as variables in the linear program. All these
values will directly define the transition matrix T , in the
following way:
ti,j =
∑
S∈Y
P (yj |yi,S)P (S|yi) (9)
As we assume that the ground-truth class of an input is
always reachable, for the inputs of class yi, the probabilities
corresponding to those sets S in which yi /∈ S will be zero.
That is, p(S|yi) = 0 if yi /∈ S . Similarly, P (yj |yi,S) must be
zero if yj /∈ S .
In order to find the appropriate values for the variables
V Si,j , we will solve the following linear program:
min z =
k∑
i=1
ti,i
s.t. P(Y ) · T = P˜(Y )
k∑
j=1
V Si,j = 1 ∀i∈{1, . . . , k} , ∀S⊂Y
0 ≤ V Si,j ≤ 1 ∀i, j∈{1, . . . , k} , ∀S⊂Y
V Si,j = 0 yj /∈ S
(10)
The main disadvantage of this method is that it requires
a considerably larger number of decision variables, bounded
by O(2kk2) assuming that for k classes, there are 2k possible
subsets of reachable classes S , each with an associated prob-
ability P (S|yi), and for each of them another distribution of
k probabilities P (yj |yi,S).
Due to the high number of possible subsets, P (S|yi)
will be zero for many of the subsets S in practice. This
reduces the number of parameters that can be tuned, and as
a consequence, also the number of probability distributions
6that can be produced. For this reason, to avoid having
multiple null values for those probabilities, in this method
we will smooth every probability distribution P (S|yi) using
the Laplace correction.
In addition, after a preliminary experiment we discov-
ered that due to the values of P (S = {yi}|yi) the lin-
ear problem was infeasible for many objective probability
distributions, especially for low distortion thresholds. This
is because the values ti,i are highly influenced by such
probabilities, which, indeed, are lower thresholds for ti,i.
In addition, those values can be considerably greater than
the rest of subsets if there is a sufficiently large proportion
of samples that can not be fooled, specially for low values of
. This also translates into a lower fooling rate expectation.
To avoid all these consequences, we set to zero every
P (S = yi|yi), even if this can reduce the effectiveness of
the method in producing the objective probability distribu-
tion, as we are not considering the estimated proportion of
samples that can not be fooled.
With these simplifications, the exact number of variables
that need to be updated in the linear program are deter-
mined by:
k
[
k−1∑
l=1
(
k − 1
l
)
(l + 1)
]
, (11)
where
(n
m
)
represents the binomial coefficient.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, as we are estimating
a probability distribution for every source-class and every
set of reachable classes S , defined by (V Si,1, V Si,2, . . . , V Si,k) it
would be possible to use this distribution instead of using T
to compute the probability of selecting each possible class.
However, we verified that this approximation achieved
worse approximations of the objective distributions P˜(Y )
than directly using the probability distributions defined in
T .
4.5 Overview of the attack strategies
All the strategies introduced in the previous sections can be
used to efficiently generate the transition matrices needed
to produce adversarial class probability distributions, all of
them containing some advantages as well as some weak-
nesses.
Method 2 provides a simple framework to generate
transition matrices, in which the modeling of the problem is
particularly suited to minimize the diagonal of the transition
matrix, what, as a consequence, maximizes the fooling rate
expectation. However, the upper-bounds used as restric-
tions may be too rigid, reducing the range of probability
distributions P˜(Y ) that can be produced.
Method 3 specifies less strict constraints to the values of
T , at the cost of compromising the fooling rate expectation,
due to the fact that it is defined as a matrix product RQ,
what makes the problem less suited to minimize the values
in the diagonal for dense matrices R.
A positive point in both Method 2 and Method 3 is the
low number of parameters to be optimized, bounded by
O(k2). Method 4, however, requires a considerably larger
number of parameters, bounded by O(2kk2), but provides
a more comprehensive and general approach to generate
the transition matrix, which allows taking into account the
particular set of reachable classes for each training instance.
5 VALIDATING OUR PROPOSAL: SETUP AND RE-
SULTS
In this section we present the particular attack algorithm,
task, dataset, model and further details regarding the exper-
imental setup used to validate our proposals. We also report
the obtained results, in which we measure the effectiveness
of the introduced approaches according to different criteria.
5.1 Underlying attack algorithm: DeepFool
As the underlying attack process used to generate targeted
adversarial perturbations, in this paper we focus on Deep-
Fool [33], a state-of-the-art algorithm to generate adversarial
attacks, initially introduced for images.
This method consists on iteratively pushing an initial in-
put x0 towards the closest decision boundary of the decision
space represented by the model. Let yc be the ground-truth
class of x0, f the target classifier, and fj the output logits
of f corresponding to the class yj . The region of space R in
which f predicts yc is defined as:
R =
k⋂
j=1
{x : fc(x) ≥ fj(x)} (12)
At each iteration i, the region R is approximated by a
polyhedron R˜i, defined as:
R˜i =
k⋂
j=1
{
x : fj(xi)− fc(xi) +5fj(xi)>x−5fc(xi)>x ≤ 0
}
(13)
Therefore, the distances between the input xi and the
boundaries ofR are approximated by the distances between
xi and the boundaries of R˜i. By using this approximation,
the closest decision boundary, which will correspond to a
class yl, is determined according to the following criterion:
l = argmin
j 6=c
∣∣∣f ′j∣∣∣∥∥∥w′j∥∥∥
2
(14)
where f ′j = fj(xi)− fc(xi) and w′j = 5fj(xi)−5fc(xi) is
the direction in which the input will be moved. Finally, xi is
pushed towards the selected decision boundary:
xi+1 ← xi + |f
′
l |
‖w′l‖22
w′l, (15)
The algorithm stops when it finally reaches a new decision
region, that is, when f(xi) 6= yc.
Different works have extended or reformulated the orig-
inal version of DeepFool in order to improve the attack
or achieve more complex goals, as described in Section 2
[9], [11], [18], [35]. In order to fit in our specification, we
will employ a targeted version of DeepFool, and impose a
stop criterion to prevent exceeding the maximum amount of
perturbation .
The targeted version of DeepFool can be obtained if, at
every iteration i, the sample is moved in the direction of
the target class yt 6= f(x0), that is, removing the criterion
specified in equation (14) and applying the following update
rule:
xi+1 ← xi + |f
′
t |
‖w′t‖22
w′t, (16)
7Algorithm 2 Targeted DeepFool
Input: A classification model f , an input sample x of class
yc, a target class yt, maximum distortion threshold 
Output: A targeted adversarial perturbation v
1: i← 0
2: xi ← x
3: v ← initialize with zeros . Total perturbation
4: ri ← initialize with zeros . Local perturbation at step i
5: while f(xi) 6= yt ∧ ||v + ri||2 ≤  do
6: f ′ ← ft(xi)− fc(xi)
7: w′ ←5ft(xi)−5fc(xi)
8: ri ← |f
′|
||w′||22w
′
9: if ||v + ri||2 ≤  then
10: v ← v + ri
11: xi+1 ← xi + ri
12: i← i+ 1
13: end if
14: end while
In this case, the process stops when the condition f(xi) = yt
is satisfied, or, again, when the amount of distortion exceeds
. Algorithm 2 provides the pseudocode for this approach.
The targeted reformulation of the DeepFool algorithm has
been reported before in [11], [34].
5.2 Case of study: speech command classification
Due to advances in automatic speech recognition tech-
nologies based on machine learning models, and their de-
ployment in smartphones, voice assistants and industrial
applications, there has been a rapid increase in the study
of adversarial attacks and defenses for such models, despite
being considerably less studied than computer vision prob-
lems. For these reasons, we have decided to validate our
proposal in the task of speech command classification, an
exemplary and representative task in this domain.
We will use the Speech Command Dataset [36], which
consists on a set of WAV audio files of 30 different spoken
commands. The duration of all the files is fixed to 1 second,
and the sample-rate is 16kHz in all the samples, so that
each audio waveform is composed by 16000 values, in the
range [−215, 215]. We will use a subset of ten classes, those
standard labels selected in previous publications [14], [36]:
Yes, No, Up, Down, Left, Right, On, Off, Stop, and Go. In
order to provide a more realistic setup, two special classes
have been also considered: Silence, representing that no
speech has been detected, and Unknown, representing an
unrecognized spoken command, or different to the ones
mentioned before.
As in previous related works [14], [37], a Convolutional
Neural Network will be used as classification model, based
on the architecture proposed in [38] for small-footprint
keyword recognition. For simplification purposes, we will
assume a uniform initial probability distribution P(Y ).
5.3 Experimental details
We generated a set of samples X by randomly sampling
a set of 500 samples per class from the training set of the
Speech Command Dataset. We ensured that all the samples
were correctly classified by the model. This set will be used
also to generate the auxiliar matrix R as described in Section
4, and therefore, used to generate the transition matrix T .
The ultimate goal is to validate that any desired prob-
ability distribution P˜(Y ) can be approximated with a low
error by guiding the extended DeepFool (Algorithm 2) using
Algorithm 1 and a transition matrix T , optimized using
any of the methods introduced in Section 4. This will be
validated in another set of samples Xˆ , disjoint from X ,
composed of 500 inputs per class, forming a total of 6000
input samples.
The objective probability distributions P˜(Y ) will be ran-
domly sampled from a Dirichlet distribution of k = 12
parameters and αi = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ 12. A total of 100 different
objective probability distributions will be sampled, and the
approach will be tested in each of them. Apart from this
set, the particular case in which P˜(Y ) = P(Y ) will be also
tested, that is, when the aim is to reproduce the original
probability distribution P(Y ) obtained by the model.
The proportion of samples that have been classified as
each particular class after the attack is applied to every input
in Xˆ will be taken as the empirical probability distribution of
Xˆ , and will be denoted Pˆ(Y ) = (pˆ1, . . . , pˆk). Using this col-
lection of data, we will evaluate to what extent the empirical
probability distributions Pˆ(Y ) match P˜(Y ). The similarity
between both distributions will be measured using different
metrics: the maximum and mean absolute difference, the
Kullback-Leibler divergence and the Spearman correlation.
The transition matrices will be generated using the four
linear programs described in Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
For Method 1 and Method 2, an upper-bound of ξ = 0.01
will be set for the values in L. The results will be computed
under the following maximum distortion thresholds:  ∈
{0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15}.
5.4 Particular case: reproducing the initial probability
distribution
For illustration purposes, we first report the results obtained
for the particular scenario in which we want to produce the
same probability distribution that the model produces when
it is applied on clean samples. Notice that this distribution
is the same as the ground truth distribution of the classes,
since we assume that the model produces a correct classifica-
tion for the original samples. Having the ability to reproduce
such distributions allows an attacker to deploy attacks that
are less likely to be detected, and without losing control over
the frequency with which each class is predicted.
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 contain, for Method 1, 2, 3 and
4, respectively, a graphical comparison of the initial prob-
ability distribution and the one produced after perturbing
the inputs with our attack, for different maximum distor-
tion thresholds . The figures also include the Kullback-
Leibler divergences between both distributions. Note that
the bottom-right chart of the four figures represents the
achieved fooling rate for every , and, as reference, the max-
imum fooling rate that can be achieved for such thresholds,
that is, the percentage of inputs in Xˆ for which it is possible
to create a targeted attack capable of fooling the model.
According to the results, in all the cases the algorithms
were able to maintain a probability distribution very close
8to the original one, being Method 1 the less accurate. In
addition, the attack maintained also fooling rates very close
to the optimal values with independence of the distortion
threshold, with a negligible loss is Method 2 and Method 4,
and with a loss of approximately 10% in Method 3.
It is noteworthy that, in this particular case, the pro-
duced probability distributions are more approximate for
the lowest values of  tried. This is due to the fact that
for low distortion thresholds the number of inputs for
which the model can be fooled is lower, and therefore, a
larger number of inputs remains correctly classified as their
ground-truth class, what makes the empirical probability
distribution Pˆ(Y ) closer to the original. However, note that
the results obtained for high values of  also represent close
approximations of the target distributions, and at the same
time, the model is fooled for almost all the input samples.
5.5 Deeper exploration
In this section we provide a deeper evaluation of the ap-
proach, testing it against 100 random probability distri-
butions, randomly drawn from a Dirichlet distribution, as
described in Section 5.3.
First, we computed the percentage of cases in which the
method managed to generate a valid transition matrix, that
is, which satisfies all the restrictions of the corresponding
linear program. This information in shown in Table 1, for
different values of . As it can be seen, Method 1, 3 and
4 managed to create a valid perturbation for all the cases
tried, independently of the maximum distortion threshold.
For Method 2, although it also achieved a total success
for values of distortion above or equal 0.05, the percentage
drops dramatically for lower values of .
Table 1 also includes the success percentages of two vari-
ants of the Method 4. In the first case, without the Laplace
correction and without fixing the probabilities P ({yi}|yi)
to zero, the method was not able to generate a valid tran-
sition matrix for distortions below 0.05, and even in the
maximum distortion tried the method only succeeded in the
50% of the cases. Applying the Laplace correction (without
fixing P ({yi}|yi) = 0), those results improve significantly,
succeeding in more than 80% of the cases for distortions
thresholds above 0.1, in 74% of the cases for 0.05 and in
25% of the cases for the lowest distortion level. These results
clearly reflect that those corrections are necessary to make
the linear programs feasible.
The similarity between the objective distributions P˜(Y )
and the corresponding empirical distributions P̂(Y ) is an-
alyzed in Figure 5, for the different similarity metrics con-
sidered. All the values have been averaged for all the target
probability distributions considered in the experiment, in-
dependently for every maximum distortion threshold. The
results obtained in the Method 2 for  = 0.005 and  = 0.01
are computed only for the cases in which the method
achieved a valid transition matrix, and therefore, the results
might be biased.
First of all, the results show that Method 1 achieves
worse results compared to the rest of the methods, what
validates the hypothesis that Method 1 can be taken as
an appropriate baseline for the problem, and also that the
TABLE 1
Success percentages in generating valid transition matrices for the
different methods introduced.
Max. distortion amount ()
0.005 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15
Method 1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Method 2 19% 87% 100% 100% 100%
Method 3 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Method 4 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Method 4 1 0% 0% 17% 33% 51%
Method 4 2 25% 38% 74% 81% 86%
1 Without the Laplace correction and without fixing
the values of P ({yi}|yi) to zero.
2 Without fixing the values of P ({yi}|yi) to zero.
strategies employed in the other methods are capable of
increasing the effectiveness of the attack.
Apart from that, it is clear that the effectiveness of the
methods in reproducing the target distribution increases
when the maximum allowed distortion increases. Regarding
the results obtained in Method 2, 3 and 4, the maximum
difference is below 0.07 for values of a distortion of 0.05
or greater, which reflects a very high similarity. In fact, for
the mean difference of all the values, this value decreases to
0.025. The KLD also shows the same descending trend as the
maximum and mean differences. Finally, the Spearman cor-
relation between both distributions is above 0.80 for those
methods, which indicates that even if there are differences
between the values, both distributions are highly correlated.
This metric also reflects a considerably higher effectiveness
in comparison to the baseline results obtained using Method
1, particularly for low values of threshold.
Comparing the effectiveness of Methods 2, 3 and 4,
as expected, Method 2 was the least effective in closely
reproducing the target distributions (considering the values
 ≥ 0.05, in which the method succeeded in all the cases and
therefore the results are directly comparable). Oppositely,
Method 2 is the most effective one according to all the met-
rics, followed by Method 3, which achieved intermediate
results between the two previous methods.
Finally, Figure 6 compares the fooling rates obtained for
each value of . The fooling rate represents the percentage of
adversarial examples that produced a wrong output in the
model. As in previous charts, this information has been av-
eraged considering all the objective probability distributions
tried, for each value of . In addition, the figure includes
the maximum fooling rate that can be obtained with a
maximum distortion .
The results demonstrate that the introduced algorithms
keep a very high fooling rate, close to the maximum in
Methods 1, 2 and 4. Method 3, as we foresaw, achieved
slightly lower fooling rates, of approximately 10% below the
maximum with independence of the distortion threshold.
Therefore, the algorithm can effectively achieve the more
complex global objective of producing a target probability
distribution for the classes while keeping a remarkable
effectiveness in the local objective of fooling any incoming
input sample.
As an overview of the distortion, Table 2 shows the
average distortion level introduced by the perturbations,
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Fig. 1. Method 1 (Baseline): Comparison between the initial probability distribution P(Y ) and the produced probability distribution Pˆ(Y ), for
different values of , in the particular case in which the objective distribution is P(Y ). The Kullback-Leibler divergence between both distributions,
DKL(P(Y )), Pˆ(Y )), is also reported above each figure. The bottom-right figure represents the achieved fooling rates, and the maximum fooling
rate that can be achieved for every , that is, the percentage of inputs in Xˆ for which it is possible to create a targeted attack capable of fooling the
model.
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Fig. 2. Method 2: Comparison between the initial probability distribution P(Y ) and the produced probability distribution Pˆ(Y ), for different values of
, in the particular case in which the objective distribution is P(Y ). The Kullback-Leibler divergence between both distributions,DKL(P(Y )), Pˆ(Y )),
is also reported above each figure. The bottom-right figure represents the achieved fooling rates, and the maximum fooling rate that can be achieved
for every , that is, the percentage of inputs in Xˆ for which it is possible to create a targeted attack capable of fooling the model.
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Fig. 3. Method 3: Comparison between the initial probability distribution P(Y ) and the produced probability distribution Pˆ(Y ), for different values of
, in the particular case in which the objective distribution is P(Y ). The Kullback-Leibler divergence between both distributions,DKL(P(Y )), Pˆ(Y )),
is also reported above each figure. The bottom-right figure represents the achieved fooling rates, and the maximum fooling rate that can be achieved
for every , that is, the percentage of inputs in Xˆ for which it is possible to create a targeted attack capable of fooling the model.
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Fig. 4. Method 4: Comparison between the initial probability distribution P(Y ) and the produced probability distribution Pˆ(Y ), for different values of
, in the particular case in which the objective distribution is P(Y ). The Kullback-Leibler divergence between both distributions,DKL(P(Y )), Pˆ(Y )),
is also reported above each figure. The bottom-right figure represents the achieved fooling rates, and the maximum fooling rate that can be achieved
for every , that is, the percentage of inputs in Xˆ for which it is possible to create a targeted attack capable of fooling the model.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of the fooling rate percentage between all the intro-
duced approaches.
in decibels (dB), computed independently for each ground-
truth class. Following the methodology introduced in [39],
the distortion has been computed as
dB(x, v) = 20 log10
(
1
d
d∑
i=1
vi
)
− 20 log10
(
1
d
d∑
i=1
xi
)
,
(17)
being x the clean signal and v the perturbation, both of
length d, and considering only the signal ranges outside
the vocal part in x. As it can be seen, even for the highest
values of  tried, the mean distortion level is below -32dB
for the majority of the classes, which is the maximum
acceptable distortion threshold assumed in related works on
adversarial perturbations in speech signals [13], [39], [40].
5.6 General comparison of the introduced approaches
As a general overview of the effectiveness of the introduced
strategies, focusing on Methods 2, 3 and 4, the three of
them provided an effective way to find optimal transition
matrices, capable of producing the desired objective prob-
ability distributions. In addition, and considering that the
effectiveness of the method depends on multiple factors,
TABLE 2
Distortion levels introduced by the adversarial perturbations generated,
measured in decibels (dB).
Max. distortion amount ()
0.005 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15
Silence -17.01 -20.71 -22.41 -22.49 -22.54
Unknown -42.32 -41.67 -37.51 -36.11 -35.43
Yes -40.44 -39.59 -31.86 -29.17 -28.04
No -41.15 -40.71 -36.75 -35.19 -34.69
Up -39.50 -39.49 -36.90 -36.41 -36.31
Down -41.24 -40.05 -35.46 -33.92 -33.24
Left -40.91 -40.52 -35.88 -34.53 -33.94
Right -40.51 -40.45 -35.29 -33.33 -32.63
On -40.71 -40.43 -36.02 -34.41 -33.73
Off -40.54 -40.28 -35.71 -34.03 -33.30
Stop -40.43 -39.66 -32.38 -30.36 -29.72
Go -41.13 -41.06 -37.58 -36.41 -36.01
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Fig. 7. Multi-factorial comparison of the effectiveness of the four methods
introduced. Note that the number of parameters is bounded byO(k2) for
Methods 1, 2 and 3
there is no one better method in all the cases. For instance,
Method 3 was the most effective one in producing the
desired probability distributions, but achieved lower fooling
rates than Method 2 and Method 4, which achieved values
close to the maximum fooling rates. In comparison to the
Method 2, Method 4 was capable of producing adversarial
distributions closer to the target ones, but requires a con-
siderably higher number of parameters, which can be pro-
hibitive for problems with a very large number of classes.
Thus, depending on the factor to be optimized, one method
could be more suitable than the others.
Figure 7 provides a graphic comparison of the effective-
ness according to the most relevant factors. Notice that some
axis are flipped to represent in all the cases that a value is
better if it is closer to bottom-left corner. As it can be seen,
the methods form a pareto-front in the majority of the cases,
particularly for  ≥ 0.05.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced a novel strategy to gen-
erate adversarial attacks capable of producing any desired
probability distribution for the classes when the attack is
applied to multiple incoming inputs. The introduced attack
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has been conceived as an extension of targeted adversarial
attacks, in which the target class is stochastically selected
under the guidance of a transition matrix, which is opti-
mized to achieve the desired goals. We have introduced
four different strategies to optimize the transition matri-
ces, which can be solved by using linear programs. We
also experimentally validated our approach for the spoken
command classification task, using as underlying attack
an extension of the DeepFool algorithm, a state-of-the-
art method to generate adversarial examples. Our results
clearly show that the introduced methods are capable of
producing close approximations of the target probability
distribution for the output classes while achieving high
fooling rates. This novel attack perspective can be used to
produce more complex malicious behaviors in the target
models, and to study adversarial attacks and defenses in
more challenging scenarios.
7 FUTURE LINES
An interesting future research line could be trying to gen-
erate adversarial class distributions using a single universal
perturbation. In this way, a single perturbation may not only
cause the misclassification of every input, but also produce a
desired probability distribution of the classes when applied
to a large number of samples.
In addition, more than one class transition could be
considered in order to increase the attack effectiveness of
DeepFool, allowing consecutive jumps between two classes,
which may increase the reachability between classes, and
as a consequence, increase the range of probability distribu-
tions that can be approximated, or improve the approxima-
tion.
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